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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Hogue from denying his 
motion his guilty plea following sentencing. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In February 11, police investigated Hogue in connection with a series of 
bad checks he issued to numerous individuals and businesses in the Boise area. 
(R., pp.109-111.) investigation revealed that Hogue paid a rent deposit, and 
purchased a vehicle, household goods, electronics, and furniture from local 
retailers with the bad checks. (Id.) Boise police officers obtained and executed a 
warrant to search Hague's residence. (R., pp.115-121.) Officers seized 
evidence relevant to the investigation, including several computers. (R., pp.31-
32; 115-121.) The state charged Hogue with three counts of grand theft, and 
three counts of felony issuing a check without funds (Case No. CR 2011-03728). 
(R., pp.96-98.) While these charges were pending, a forensic examination of the 
computers recovered from Hague's residence revealed evidence of the presence 
of child pornography. (R., pp.31-32.) In a separate case, the state charged 
Hogue with two counts of possession of sexually exploitative material. See Idaho 
Data Repository, Ada County, Case No. CR 2011-20152. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hogue pied guilty to one count of grand 
theft, and one count of issuing a check without funds, and the state agreed to 
dismiss the remaining charges in Case No. CR 2011-03728. (See generally 
1 
#400051 1/27/12 Tr.) At the time of his guilty pleas, Hague's child pornography 
case, CR 2011-20152, was still in its preliminary hearing stage. (#40005 1/27/12 
Tr., p.2, Ls.10-16; see also Idaho Data Repository, Ada County, Case No. CR 
2011-20152.) Still, the state agreed to recommend that Hague's grand theft and 
issuing a check without funds charges run concurrent with his future sentence in 
the child pornography case. (#40005 1/27/12 Tr., p.2, Ls.10-20.) The district 
court imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years with five years fixed for grand 
theft, and a concurrent fixed sentence of three years for issuing a check without 
funds. (#40005 5/8/12 Tr., p.30, Ls.7-20.) The court recognized that it could not 
impose these sentences concurrently with any future sentence that may later be 
imposed in Case No. CR 2011-20152, but stated that it had "no objection" to the 
presiding judge in that case imposing its sentence concurrently to those in Case 
No. CR 2011-03728. (#40005 5/8/12 Tr., p.29, Ls.11-18.) 
In Case No. CR 2011-20152, Hogue eventually pied guilty to one count of 
possession of sexually exploitative material. See State v. Hogue, 2013 
Unpublished Opinion No. 567, Docket No. 40273 (Idaho App., July 5, 2013). The 
district court in that case imposed Hogue's sentence consecutively to his prior 
grand theft and issuing a check without funds sentences imposed in Case No. 
CR 2011-03728. kl, p.1. 
Hogue then filed a prose motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in case CR 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court took judicial notice of the clerk's record and 
reporter's transcript filed in prior appeal No. 40005, in which Hogue challenged 
the sentences imposed in the same underlying criminal case that is the subject of 
this appeal. (R., p.2); see also State v. Hogue, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 
530, Docket No. 40005 (Idaho App., June 10, 2013). 
2 
No. 2011-03728. (R., pp.22-33.) Hogue alleged that his guilty pleas to the grand 
theft and issuing a check without funds charges were involuntary and unknowing 
because, during his pretrial detainment at the Ada County jail, he was placed in a 
"behavior modification plan," and was denied access to his attorney, legal 
documents, and legal mail, and because his appointed attorneys failed to bring 
this to the attention of the court (Id.) The district court denied Hague's motion. 
(R., pp.34-40.) Hogue timely appealed. (R., pp.49-53.) 
3 
ISSUE 
on as: 
Did district court abuse its discretion when it 
motion withdraw his plea? 
state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as: 
Has Hogue failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty given his failure to establish 
manifest injustice? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Hoaue Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion Bv 
Denying His Motion To Withdraw His Guiltv Pleas Given His Failure To Establish 
Manifest Injustice 
Introduction 
Hogue contends that the court abused its discretion in denying 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to grand theft and issuing a check without 
funds. (See generally Appellant's brief.) Specifically, Hogue contends, for the 
first time on appeal, that his pleas were unknowing because he was not aware 
that the district court lacked the authority to impose his sentences concurrently 
with future sentences that had yet been imposed. (Id.) Hogue argues that 
this was a direct consequence of his guilty pleas of which the district court was 
required to specifically advise him. (Id.) 
This Court should not consider Hague's argument because he failed to 
preserve it for appeal. VVhile Hogue moved to withdraw his guilty pleas below, he 
did so on entirely separate grounds than he raises on appeal. Further, even if 
Hogue had preserved this issue, he has failed to show manifest injustice that 
would necessitate the withdrawal of his guilty pleas. A district court is not 
required to warn a defendant of the possibility that a future sentencing court 
might run its sentence consecutively to the defendant's current sentence. 
5 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished 
from arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 
775, 780-781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 
P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's 
factual findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. 
Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 
869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. Hogue Failed To Preserve His Argument That The District Court Failed To 
Warn Him Of The Direct Consequences Of His Guilty Pleas 
Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time 
on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 ( 1991). The 
district court must be given the opportunity to correct any alleged errors. In this 
case, Hogue moved for the withdrawal of his pleas, however he did so on a 
completely different ground than he raises on appeal. Rather than raise any 
issue regarding potential future sentences that may be imposed consecutively, 
Hogue asserted his pleas were not knowing or voluntary because, during his 
pretrial detention, he was denied access to his attorney, legal documents, and 
legal mail, and because his appointed attorneys failed to bring this to the 
attention of the court. (R., pp.22-33.) 
Because Hogue never gave the district court the opportunity to address 
his assertion that it erred by failing to advise him of the possibility that future 
6 
sentencing courts may impose their sentences consecutively to his current 
sentences, this issue is not preserved and this Court shouid not consider it on 
appeal. 
D. Even If Hague's Argument Was Preserved. He Has Failed To Establish 
Manifest lniustice Necessitating The \fJithdrawal Of His Guilty Pleas 
Generally, a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea will not be granted after 
sentencing. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990); 
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988). A court 
may permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing only upon a 
satisfactory showing by the defendant that withdrawal of the guilty plea is neces-
sary to correct a "manifest injustice." I.C.R. 33(c). 
The strictness of the standard is justified by the legal weight of the guilty 
plea. "A plea of guilty has the same force and effect as a judgment rendered af-
ter a full trial on the merits." Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 346, 647 P.2d 796, 
802 (Ct. App. 1982). The stricter standard also insures that the defendant is not 
"encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment and 
withdraw the plea if the sentence is unexpectedly severe." State v. Stone, 147 
Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009). The defendant has the bur-
den of proving that the plea should be withdrawn. ~; State v. Gomez, 124 Idaho 
177,178,857 P.2d 656,657 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Manifest injustice is established as a matter of law where a plea is "not 
taken in compliance with constitutional due process standards." State v. Thomas, 
154 Idaho 305, 307, 297 P.3d 268, 270 (Ct. App. 2013); see also State v. 
7 
Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97, 156 P.3d 1193, 1195 (2007). Constitutional due 
process standards require "that a guilty plea be made voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently," as shown by the "record of the entire proceedings, including 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." Thomas, 154 Idaho at 307, 297 P.3d at 
270 (citing I.C.R. 11 (c)). 
In Idaho, the trial court must follow the minimum requirements of I.C.R. 
11(c) in accepting guilty pleas. State v. Mauro. 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 
109, 111 (1991) (quoting State v. Detweiler, 115 Idaho 443, 446, 767 P.2d 286, 
289 (Ct. App. 1989)). If the record indicates that the trial court followed the 
requirements of I.C.R. 11(c), this is a prima facie showing that the plea is 
voluntary and knowing. Mauro, 121 Idaho at 180, 824 P.2d at 111. One of the 
requirements of I. C.R. 11 ( c) is showing that "[t]he defendant was informed of the 
consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments, and 
other direct consequences which may apply." I.C.R. 11 (c)(2). 
Thus, prior to accepting a guilty plea, a court is only required to inform the 
defendant of the direct consequences of the plea. Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 
99, 982 P.2d 931, 934 (1999). A consequence is direct if it presents "a definite, 
immediate and largely automatic effect on the defendant's range of punishment." 
State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 458, 460, 4 P.3d 570, 572 (Ct. App. 2000). A 
consequence is more likely to be direct if the defendant has no power to prevent 
the consequence, if the nature of the consequence is punitive, and if the 
sentencing judge has control over imposing the consequence. Ray, 133 Idaho at 
99-101, 982 P.2d at 934-36. However, a court is not required to inform a 
8 
defendant of consequences of a guilty plea that are merely collateral or indirect. 
State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55 P.3d 879, 880; Ray, 133 Idaho at 99-
101, 982 P.2d at 934-36. A contingent possibility resulting from a guilty plea is 
not a direct consequence embraced by Rule 11. See Carter v. State, 116 Idaho 
468, 468-469, 776 P.2d 830, 830-831 (Ct. App. 1989). 
In Miller, the defendant moved for the withdrawal of his guilty pleas to 
three counts of burglary prior to sentencing, alleging that at the time of his pleas 
he was not informed that his Idaho offenses could be used against him for 
sentencing purposes in criminal cases in Washington that were pending at the 
time of his Idaho guilty pleas. Miller, 134 Idaho at 459, 4 P.3d at 570. However, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a sentence's possible enhancing effect on 
subsequent sentences in a case where a conviction had not yet been entered 
was merely a collateral consequence of a guilty plea. kl at 459-461, 4 P.3d at 
571-573. The Court recognized that the potential impact of Miller's Idaho 
sentence on his future Washington sentences was entirely contingent upon the 
resolution of the Washington case and the sentencing determinations of the 
Washington court: 
Miller could have been afforded the benefit of plea 
agreements in Washington which Miller could have either accepted 
or declined. Terms of those agreements could have included 
sentencing recommendations on the part of the state or 
agreements by the state to recommend that the Washington trial 
courts not use Miller's Idaho offenses when they fashioned his 
sentences. Additionally, Miller could have been acquitted of the 
Washington charges. Thus, it was only a contingent possibility that 
· his Idaho offenses would be considered in fashioning his sentences 
in Washington. The use of Miller's Idaho guilty pleas in Washington 
was not a "definite, immediate, and largely automatic" consequence 
of his guilty pleas in Idaho. Therefore, Miller has not shown that the 
9 
district court failed to comply with I.C.R. 11(c) when it accepted his 
guilty pleas. 
kl at 461, 4 P.3d at 573 (emphasis in original). 
Similarly, in the present case, the impact of Hague's grand theft and 
issuing checks without funds sentences on his future sentence for possession of 
sexually exploitative material was entirely contingent on the resolution of the 
latter case, which was still pending at the time of Hague's guilty pleas in the 
present case. Thus, the district court's decision to run Hague's possession of 
sexually exploitative material conviction consecutively to Hague's previous 
sentences was not a "definitive, immediate, and largely automatic" consequence 
of Hague's pleas to grand theft and issuing a check without funds. Further, the 
district court that accepted Hague's pleas in the present case had no power over 
the other sentencing court's later sentencing determination. For these reasons, 
the possibility that Hague's possession of sexually exploitative material sentence 
might be run consecutively to his grand theft and issuing a check without funds 
sentences was merely a potential collateral consequence of Hogue's guilty pleas 
in the present case. Therefore, the district court was not required to inform 
Hogue of this possibility. 2 
2 Additionally, the district court did inform Hogue, in general terms, and prior to 
the entry of his guilty pleas, that "sentence[s] can be imposed consecutively in 
Idaho." (#40005 1/27/12 Tr., p.7, Ls.20-23.) While the district court was warning 
Hogue specifically of the possibility that it itself could impose Hague's grand theft 
and issuing a check without funds sentences consecutively, the court gave no 
reason for Hogue to believe that it was unlawful for a court to impose a sentence 
consecutively to a previous sentence in a separate case. The court also warned 
Hogue that the parties' sentencing recommendations were not binding on it and 
that "the only person who can promise you what sentence you will receive is the 
judge." (#40005 1/27/12 Tr., p.11, L.22- p.12, L.4.) 
10 
The district court was not required to warn Hogue that it had no authority 
to impose its sentences concurrently with future sentences which had not yet 
been imposed, or that future sentencing judges may impose their sentences 
consecutively to its own sentences. Hogue has therefore failed to establish 
manifest injustice that would necessitate a withdrawal of his guilty pleas. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's denial 
of Hogue's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
DATED this 27th day of December, 2013. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of December, 2013 served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
MWO/pm 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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